1A. It overlooked the possibility that emotions may be controlled.B. It ignored the fact that emotions are personal and subjective.C. It classified emotions simply as either positive or negative.D. It measured positive and negative emotions independently.2E. Sitting alone without doing anything seemed really distressing.F. Solitude adversely affected the participants' mental well-being.G. Sitting alone for 15 minutes made the participants restless.H. Solitude had a reductive effect on high-arousal emotions.3A.It proved hard to depict objectively.J. It went hand in hand with sadness.K. It helped increase low-arousal emotions.L. It tended to intensify negative emotions.

Film School Choosing the Film School Program that is Right for You Researching Film School Options Film School Location Film School that Meets Your Career Needs Film School Degrees vs. Film School Diplomas Applying to Film School Making an Application Film for Film School Other Requirements for Film School ApplicationsWhich should one choose if he or she wants to produce an artistic film to explore the intricacies of human psychology（） A. Industry film school. B. Independent film school. C. Experimental film school. D. Documentary film school. A. Film School B. Film schools and film directing schools provide aspiring film students with a solid understanding of the many facets of the film industry. While graduating from one of the many top film schools or film directing schools does not ensure a film school graduate success in the film industry, it certainly increases the odds in his or her favor. The film industry is becoming much more competitive and graduates of film schools or film directing schools have more doors opened to them because of their film school or film directing school diploma or degree. Because graduating from one of the many film schools and film directing schools requires lots of time and money, make sure that film school or film directing school is, in fact, the option that will best help you reach your film career goals. C. Choosing the Film School Program that is Right for You D. The film industry is a lucrative, multi-faceted one. Depending on what part of film production and movie making you would like to learn, there is a film school or film directing school for you. Top film schools and film directing schools are located all over the United States, and choosing the right one can often prove very difficult to a prospective film student. E. Researching Film School Options F. Due to the increasing demand of film-related jobs, film schools have been increasing in number. However, not all of these film schools issue film degrees or film diplomas that are taken seriously in the film industry. To be sure that you avoid attending one of these film schools, make sure you do plenty of research on the film school. Some questions you may want ask yourself are: G. · Has this film school or film directing school been around for a while H. · Is this film school or film directing school affiliated with a major university I. · Does this film school have the credentials to back up its program J. · Have this film school’s teachers worked in the industry

Doctors believe that secondhand smoke may cause lung cancer in people who do not smoke. Nonsmokers often breathe in the smoke from other people’s cigarettes. This is secondhand smoke. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reports that about fifty-three thousand people die in America each year as a result of exposure to secondhand smoke. The smoke that comes from a lit cigarette contains many different poisonous chemicals. In the past, scientists did not think that these chemicals harm a nonsmoker’s health. Recently, though, scientists expressed their opinion after they studied a large group of nonsmokers. They discovered that even nonsmokers had unhealthy amounts of these toxic chemicals in their bodies. As a matter of fact, almost all of us breathe tobacco smoke at times, whether we realize it or not. For example, we cannot avoid secondhand smoke in restaurants, hotels, and other public places. Even though many public places have nonsmoking areas, smoke flows in from the areas where smoking is permitted. It is even harder for children to avoid secondhand smoke. In America, nine million children under the age of five live in homes with at least one smoker. Research shows that these children are sick more often than the children who live in homes where no one smokes. The damaging effects of secondhand smoke on children also continue as they grow up. The children of smokers are more than twice as likely to develop lung cancer when they are adults as the children of nonsmokers. The risk is even higher for the children who live in homes where both parents smoke.Which group of children suffer from secondhand smoking to the greatest extent A. Children under the age of five living in homes with no smokers.B. Children under the age of five living in homes with one parent smoking.A.Children under the age of five living in homes with two parents smoking.D. Children under the age of five living away from their parents.

Rewrite the parts in italics(斜体) of the following sentences with the proper words of conversion, making changes where necessary.1 When you send me the email, please let me know the days when you are free.2 When sea level rises, it can increase the height of storm waves, putting more areas in danger of damage.3 The letter must have sat in the drawer for such a long time that it has become yellow.4 Bob lives not far from the school he attends. So he goes to school by bicycle.5 When the color turns green it means they're doing well, when the color turns red it means they might't.

29 Trust is fundamental to life. If you can’t trust anything, life becomes intolerable. You can’t have relationships without trust, let alone good ones. In the workplace, too, trust is 26. An organization without trust will be full of fear and 27. If you work for a boss who doesn’t trust their employees to do things right, you’ll have a 28time. They’ll be checking up on you all the time, correcting “mistakes” and 29reminding you to do this or that. Colleagues who don’t trust one another will need to spend more time 30their backs than doing any useful work. Organizations are always trying to cut costs. Think of all the additional tasks caused by lack of trust. Audit (审计) departments only exist because of it. Companies keep large volumes of 31because they don’t trust their suppliers, their contractors or their customers. Probably more than half of all administrative work is only there because of an ever-existing sense that “you can’t trust anyone these days.” If even a small part of such valueless work could be 32, the savings would run into millions of dollars. All this is extra work we 33onto ourselves because we don’t trust people—the checking, following through, doing things ourselves because we don’t believe others will do them 34—or at all. If we took all that away, how much extra time would we suddenly find in our life? How much of our work 35would disappear?A、constantly B、credible C、essential D、exploring E、gather F、load G、miserable A.pressureB.properly C.records D.removed E.stacks F.suspicion G.tracked H.watching

Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the public’s long-term interests. As policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tiffs crisis. The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase" multiple standard deviation events" more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial deterioration. This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs ’alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility. Third, size matters. For example, whether you owned 5 billion or 50 billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a 50 billion exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new instruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system. Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account for asset values accurately enough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting -- which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities -- is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly valued their positions and commitments at the outset, they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures. The daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in instruments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions. As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our industry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the global nature of trades and their cross-asset characteristics, managing operational risk will only become more important. Risk and control functions need to be completely independent from the business units. And clarity as to whom risk and control managers report to is crucial to maintaining that independence. Equally important, risk managers need to have at least equal stature with their counterparts on the trading desks: if there is a question about the value of a position or a disagreement about a risk limit, the risk manager’s view should always prevail. Understandably, compensation continues to generate a lot of anger and controversy. We recognize that having troubled asset relief programme money creates an important context for compensation. That is why, in part, our executive management team elected not to receive a bonus in 2008, even though the firm produced a profit. More generally, we should apply basic standards to how we compensate people in our industry. The percentage of the discretionary (任意的)bonus awarded in equity should increase significantly as an employee’s total compensation increases. An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm. For policymakers and regulators, it should be clear that self-regulation has its limits. We rationalized and justified the downward pricing of risk on the grounds that it was different. We did so because our self-interest in preserving and expanding our market share, as competitors, sometimes blinds us -- especially when exuberance is at its peak. At the very least, fixing a system-wide problem, elevating standards or driving the industry to a collective response requires effective central regulation and the convening power of regulators. Capital, credit and underwriting standards should be subject to more" dynamic regulation". Regulators should consider the regulatory inputs and outputs needed to ensure a regime that is nimble and strong enough to identify and appropriately constrain market excesses, particularly in a sustained period of economic growth. Just as the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates up to curb economic frenzy, various benchmarks and ratios could be appropriately calibrated. To increase overall transparency and help ensure that book value really means book value, regulators should require that, all assets across financial institutions be similarly valued. Fair value accounting gives investors more clarity with respect to balance sheet risk. The level of global supervisory co-ordination and communication should reflect the global interconnectedness of markets. Regulators should implement more robust information sharing and harmonized disclosure, coupled with a more systemic, effective reporting regime for institutions and main market participants. Without this, regulators will lack essential tools to help them understand levels of systemic vulnerability in the banking sector and in financial markets more broadly. In this vein, all pools of capital that depend on the smooth functioning of the financial system and are large enough to be a burden on it in a crisis should be subject to some degree of regulation.What was the consequence of an over-reliance on credit ratings A．Increasing triple A companies.B．Declining trustworthiness on rating agencies.C．Deficiency in credit judgments.D．Collapse of financial institutions.

Directions: For this part, you are allowed 30 minutes to write a short essay on the challenges of studying abroad. You should write at least 120 words but no more than 180 words.

plete the following sentences by-|||-wanslating the Chenese in English,using the-|||-emphatic sentence structure"It is/was... that-|||-who ........-|||-Model: __ (正是在这里你-|||-会真正发现)what learning is about.-|||-→It is here that you will truly discover what-|||-learning is about.-|||-1 __-|||-__-|||-(正是山姆认为)that the greatest achievement-|||-of last century was the landing of mankind on-|||-the moon.-|||-2 __-|||-__-|||-(正是在本科学习期间)I found out what my-|||-passion was.-|||-3 __-|||-__-|||-(正是孩子的好奇心和创造力)causes many-|||-educators to believe that teaching should-|||-stimulate children`s interest in learning.

({B)} Don’t Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk({/B)} Since the spring, and most acutely this autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy. Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enough questions about whether some of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the public’s long-term interests.({B)}Seven important lessons({/B)} As policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect on some of the lessons from tiffs crisis. The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase" multiple standard deviation events" more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing. Second, too many financial institutions and investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider other indicators of financial deterioration. This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs ’alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility. Third, size matters. For example, whether you owned 5 billion or 50 billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a 50 billion exposure. Fourth, many risk models incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an industry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges. Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies with large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business. Sixth, complexity got the better of us. The industry let the growth in new instruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system. Last, and perhaps most important, financial institutions did not account for asset values accurately enough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting -- which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities -- is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly valued their positions and commitments at the outset, they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures.({B)}Fair value: a discipline for financial institutions({/B)} The daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively early in markets and in instruments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions. As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important principles for our industry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the global nature of trades and their cross-asset characteristics, managing operational risk will only become more important. Risk and control functions need to be completely independent from the business units. And clarity as to whom risk and control managers report to is crucial to maintaining that independence. Equally important, risk managers need to have at least equal stature with their counterparts on the trading desks: if there is a question about the value of a position or a disagreement about a risk limit, the risk manager’s view should always prevail. Understandably, compensation continues to generate a lot of anger and controversy. We recognize that having troubled asset relief programme money creates an important context for compensation. That is why, in part, our executive management team elected not to receive a bonus in 2008, even though the firm produced a profit. More generally, we should apply basic standards to how we compensate people in our industry. The percentage of the discretionary (任意的)bonus awarded in equity should increase significantly as an employee’s total compensation increases. An individual’s performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm.({B)}Limitations of self regulation({/B)} For policymakers and regulators, it should be clear that self-regulation has its limits. We rationalized and justified the downward pricing of risk on the grounds that it was different. We did so because our self-interest in preserving and expanding our market share, as competitors, sometimes blinds us -- especially when exuberance is at its peak. At the very least, fixing a system-wide problem, elevating standards or driving the industry to a collective response requires effective central regulation and the convening power of regulators. Capital, credit and underwriting standards should be subject to more" dynamic regulation". Regulators should consider the regulatory inputs and outputs needed to ensure a regime that is nimble and strong enough to identify and appropriately constrain market excesses, particularly in a sustained period of economic growth. Just as the Federal Reserve adjusts interest rates up to curb economic frenzy, various benchmarks and ratios could be appropriately calibrated. To increase overall transparency and help ensure that book value really means book value, regulators should require that, all assets across financial institutions be similarly valued. Fair value accounting gives investors more clarity with respect to balance sheet risk. The level of global supervisory co-ordination and communication should reflect the global interconnectedness of markets. Regulators should implement more robust information sharing and harmonized disclosure, coupled with a more systemic, effective reporting regime for institutions and main market participants. Without this, regulators will lack essential tools to help them understand levels of systemic vulnerability in the banking sector and in financial markets more broadly. In this vein, all pools of capital that depend on the smooth functioning of the financial system and are large enough to be a burden on it in a crisis should be subject to some degree of regulation.The author believes that financial institutions can reduce credit crisis if ______. A．positions and commitments were initially assessed preciselyB．asset values were accounted for properlyC．financial liabilities were assigned preciselyD．positions were valued fairly